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ABSTRACT (200 words max.) 
In this paper I argue for a particular reading of narcissism that challenges the 
privileging of narrative as a sense-making device, with important consequences for an 
evaluation of the story paradigm in psychotherapeutic work. I lean on the 
psychoanalytic mechanisms of nachträglichkeit and trauma to trouble dominant 
therapeutic logics that support the primacy of the (narcissistically centered) narrative 
‘I’. Rather than endorse the story of ‘me, me, me’ that popular readings of narcissism 
invoke, I explore the possibility that, in psychoanalysis, narcissism’s modes 
destabilise the I, making the narrator constitutionally unreliable, and her accounts of 
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Anton Chekov, the late nineteenth-century Russian writer who excelled at the short 
story form, advised that when composing a story, writers should cultivate the habit of 
cutting-off the beginning and the end. Why? For the simple reason that it is here that 
we are especially prone to lie. The clinician, as much as the story-teller, may agree 
that beginnings and endings are particularly vulnerable to falsehoods and fabrications 
on the grounds that it is at these critical junctures that we strain most to give sense and 
shape to experience. Invoking the literary wisdom of beginning in medias res, 
Chekov, then, encourages us to remain alert to the false notes of our own 
compositions, and perhaps, as a consequence, to retain a degree of scepticism within 
our reading and writing practices. In this paper, I want to keep in mind Chekov’s 
literary advice and ask what resonance it may have once transposed to the clinical 
frame.  
As far as clinical practice goes, we might readily think of patients who come 
along, session by session, with their first lines prepared; patients who may, in time, 
come to articulate their propensity to script themselves into speech. We might also 
think of patients who make clear that they are, one way or another, profoundly 
wedded to the particular version of the story that they are compelled to recount; 
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patients for whom the once upon a time signals the opening of a narrative that, to 
begin with at least, must remain utterly faithful to the received and established 
coordinates of plot and character. When stories are worn too tightly – taken as gospel, 
so to speak – then the teller risks becoming a mouthpiece for a story that, in truth, she 
is yet to make her own.  
When Sigmund Freud comments on the unexpected similarity between the 
case histories he writes and the short stories composed by imaginative writers, he 
does so in defence of his science:  
 
[…] it still strikes me myself as strange that the case histories I write should 
read like short stories and that, as one might say, they lack the serious stamp 
of science. I must console myself with the reflection that the nature of the 
subject is evidently responsible for this, rather than any preference of my 
own. (Freud 1893: 160) 
 
If the form of the case-history were to reflect a preference on the part of the writer, its 
scientific objectivity, Freud implies, would be compromised. The reason, then, that 
Freud’s case histories resemble short stories is because the psychoanalytic symptom 
can only be made intelligible when listened to in the context of the “story of the 
patient’s sufferings” – hence the Doctor’s account of the case will necessarily reflect 
the shape of his patient’s story (1893: 161). That much is straightforward enough. 
Perhaps though, it is deceptively straightforward. Without dismissing Freud’s 
explanation – or is it an apologia? – for the form his clinical writing takes, there is 
another, distinctly Freudian line of thought to open up here, namely that 
psychoanalysis does not really deal in stories at all, at least not in any idea of a story 
that adheres to a narrative model of smooth chronological progression through 
beginning-middle-and-end. For a story to begin we need to set the scene, to 
understand where the patient-protagonist has come from, perhaps give a bit of family 
history, or an insight into her motivations for being on the couch. And in order to end, 
we have to have a sense that, not only have we travelled, but have also arrived 
somewhere, and that we are, as a result, in a position to given an account of the 
journey. This is the form that conventional clinical narration invariably takes. But 
there is certainly something missing in this, something about this story that does not 
quite ring true.  
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Frequently, collections of psychotherapeutic case-studies, especially those 
intended to cross-over between clinical and mainstream publics, deploy the 
terminology of the tale in their title (a prime example being Irvin Yalom’s Love’s 
executioner and other tales of psychotherapy, 1991).1 Central to this idea of the tale is 
the seduction of story-telling to which I refer in this paper’s title. As is known to 
anyone who has delivered stories to children at bedtime, the demand is placed on the 
teller to repeat the story without difference; it is the familiarity of the tale that assures 
the child’s pleasure economy is not irrevocably disrupted. This is not to say that there 
is no place for punctuating moments of arrest, surprise or horror within the story’s 
unfolding, but, much like the resolution achieved in a piece of music by the final 
sounding of an established cadence, when the last page is turned the audience will 
have been reassured (their psychic equilibrium restored) by the known conventions of 
form. The principle of narrative consolation is thus central to the logic of the clinical 
tale. Indeed, the psychoanalytic Ur-tale Fort-Da! is often taken to epitomise this very 
logic. 2  However, as will be my suggestion, the tale also keeps us connected to 
Chekov’s warning about the lie. “Tell-tale-tit! / your tongue will split / and all the 
little birdies / will have a little bit,” so goes the familiar playground chant wherein the 
teller of tall tales is denounced as a tell-tale. If, as readers, we are now accustomed to 
“trusting the tale,” can we necessarily say the same of the teller (Kreiswirth 1992)? 
Or, perhaps more pertinently from a clinical perspective, what conception of the 
speaking subject is proffered when psychotherapeutic work is directed towards the 
goal of telling a coherent narrative?  
Writing prior to the embedding of the so-called narrative turn in the Anglo-
American Humanities, the literary critic Lionel Trilling noted in 1973 that “a chief 
part of the inauthenticity of narration would seem to be its assumption that life is 
susceptible of comprehension and thus of management” (135). In tune with Chekov’s 
counsel, Trilling’s account of the “inauthenticity of narration” will be worth bearing 
in mind: specifically, I propose to consider how the assumption that narration is 
                                                        
1
 Diverse examples stand alongside Yalom’s, which vary in the way they blend case-history with 
memoir, fiction and other genre conventions, include: The fifty-minute hour: A collection of true 
psychoanalytic tales (Lindner 1999); Couch tales: Short stories (Kennedy 2009); The stolen girl and 
other stories: seven psychoanalytical tales (Touton-Victor 2011); Tales from the therapy room: Shrink-
wrapped (Lapworth 2011); Let’s keep talking: Lacanian tales of love, sex, and other catastrophes 
(Baldwin 2016) – the list goes on.  
2 See, for example, Terry Eagleton’s account in which Fort-Da! stands the “shortest story we can 
imagine” on the grounds that it provides a template for (object) loss and (object) recovery from which 
even the most “complex narratives” then derive (1996: 160).  
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commensurate with comprehension and life management has been uncritically 
extended in recent decades. Whilst we know ideas of narrative coherence have a 
prominent (and legitimate) place in particular psychotherapeutic modalities, I shall 
focus on what I regard to be the more problematic area of cultural reception. 3 
Specifically, I want to demonstrate how certain prominent sociological styles have 
framed therapy as a narrative tool for extending the managerial capacities of what 
Dennis Wrong famously diagnosed back in 1961 as sociology’s “oversocialized 
conception of man.”4 If, as I contend, the emancipatory potential of narration – or of 
narrative re-description – is given credence by a cultural zeitgeist in which projects of 
self-fashioning, self-actualisation, and self-determination all hold sway, then we are 
invited to think carefully about the term narcissism. When understood in the crude 
me, me, me sense of popular readings, narcissism would seem a fitting term to apply 
to a culture in which social actors use therapy to re-write the star part in their their 
own stories.5 Indeed, from the perspective of 2017 where narcissism has featured 
heavily in mainstream discourse as the go-to label for both individual and cultural 
presentations of grandiose, vain, shallow, self-obsessed behaviours, the me, me, me 
narcissist is a difficult one to ignore. However, to limit our appreciation of narcissism 
to what we might call this trumped-up version would give a severely jaundiced view 
of the matter. Narcissism, especially when read for its psychoanalytic complexities, 
proves a remarkably rich heuristic to work with (as has been the goal of several recent 
works to demonstrate, e.g. DeArmitt 2014; Lunbeck 2014; Walsh 2015). It is my 
intention here to demonstrate how a particular reading of narcissism challenges the 
operation of narrative as a sense-making device, which, in turn, should encourage us 
to reflect on the general value of the story paradigm for psychotherapeutic work.  
                                                        
3 Unfortunately, it falls beyond the scope of this article to map the lines of influence between the 
sizeable fields of narrative psychology and narrative medicine, and the development of 
psychotherapeutic models. That said, we should recognise the part played by the rise of trauma studies 
in forging the link between narrative reconstruction as a therapeutic enterprise, and narrative as a 
general human and political value. It makes sense to cite Judith Lewis Herman’s seminal work here as 
a prominent example of such a link: Herman states that rather than being defeated by that which seems 
to defy narrative, the combined work of the therapist and patient enables a therapeutic recovery 
whereby “in the telling, the trauma story becomes a testimony” (1992: 181).  
4
 Wrong formulated that such a conception could only fail to acknowledge the importance of 
“biography, of the motivational depths and complexities of the human heart, and of the somatic, animal 
roots of our emotional lives” – all components of social life that psychoanalytic, feminist, queer, and 
affect oriented analyses have kept more firmly in the picture in recent decades (Wrong 1977: 54). 
5  I have argued elsewhere that, not without reason, a certain lineage of cultural criticism makes 
synonymous the terms “therapy culture” and “narcissistic culture” (Walsh 2015: 82-114).  
 5
To move through this terrain, I propose the following development. First, 
rather than begin in the metapsychological landscape, I want to think about how the 
story of therapy itself has been narrated, and how this story is invariably framed with 
reference to the concept of narcissism. Most obviously, there are the cultural 
commentaries from the 1970s to acknowledge wherein narcissistic pathologies are 
understood as a symptom of cultural malaise (Christopher Lasch 1979; Richard 
Sennett 1974; Tom Wolf 1976; Jim Hougan 1975). Allowing for considerable 
variation on the theme, the logic here runs that narcissism rises in accord with the 
decline of cultural authority and the impoverishment of public space – twin factors 
that feed into the “veritable discursive explosion” of all matters therapeutic.6 The 
“triumph of the therapeutic,” as Philip Rieff (1973 [1966]) first coined the phrase, has 
proven an enduring motif beyond the cultural declinism of the 1970s, segueing more 
recently with critical assessments of the emotional state(s) of cultural life, and the 
status of emotions in cultural discourse. We will notice that within this field of 
discourse there is an understanding of therapeutic logic that supports the primacy of 
the narrative I. Second, I shall outline the most salient aspects of a psychoanalytic 
account of subject-formation that disrupt such a vision. Here we shall see how any 
conventional sense of narrative movement from beginning through middle and on to 
end is thoroughly undermined by the concept of Nachträglichkeit, a model of 
temporality and causality that was necessitated by the Freudian theory of trauma. By 
radically upsetting time’s arrow, we will observe how psychoanalysis insists on the 
difficulty of telling a story straight. Next, attending to both the scenic and structural 
components of narcissism, I shall advance a double claim to show how, 
psychoanalytically understood, narcissism is both that which appears to establish the 
foundation for the narrative subject, and that which insists on undermining anything 
that could be called a narrative identity. Our discussion here will remain connected to 
the development of Freud’s account of trauma via the theory of the drives. When, by 
the end of the paper, we are in a position to consider the characteristics of a so-called 
narcissistic story, rather than find an account of me, me, me that popular readings of 
narcissism would invoke, we may find narrative modes that destabilise the I, making 
the narrator constitutionally unreliable, and her accounts of all subject-object 
distinctions uncertain and constantly shifting.  
                                                        
6 The coinage, of course, is Michel Foucault’s regarding sex talk (1988: 17). 
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Narrative selfhood in therapeutic culture 
The guiding premise of this paper is that the psychoanalytic project reminds us that as 
soon as we put an account of ourselves into story form, we risk speaking beyond our 
means; certainly, we risk speaking out of sync with the radical implications of a 
psychoanalytic theory of the subject. However, the talking cure also insists that we 
must, of course, endeavour to speak! And it is true that we cannot speak without 
recourse to stories of some form or another. “Deprive children of stories,” warns the 
moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre, “and you leave them unscripted, anxious 
stutterers in their actions as in their words” (2007 [1981]: 216).  
I want in this section to problematize a particular trend in contemporary 
thought whereby the achievement of a self-driven narrative –a story in which the 
narrative I convenes the project of self-actualisation – is taken to be the principal goal 
of therapeutic work. To explore this line of development it will be helpful to be 
reminded of what Denise Riley has referred to as “that usual antithesis […] between 
language as speaking us, and our status as freely choosing users of language” (2005: 
3). Inclined to reject the either/or in favour of the both/and, a psychoanalytic 
approach would have it that as we endeavour to master language, we will be forever 
mastered by it; as we narrate, so too we will be narrated. But this insistence on the 
limitations of our empowered self-narration does not necessarily connect with 
culturally prevalent accounts of the therapeutic project. Whilst it would be bizarre (if 
not disingenuous) to suggest that psychotherapy does not work in the service of aiding 
the subject’s capacity to narrate his- or herself, the point of qualification that I am 
keen to make is that when the vision of an empowered (or even omnipotent) narrator 
becomes synonymous with a broad brush cultural understanding of therapy, it is then 
increasingly difficult to imagine ways in which psychotherapeutic work might resist 
the directives of the prevailing social order. 
Anthony Giddens’s highly influential and deeply contested sociological 
framing of the therapeutic project can serve as our inroad to this discussion. Giddens’ 
work in this area revolves around his concept of “the reflexive project of the self,” 
which is defined as “the process whereby self-identity is constituted by the reflexive 
ordering of self-narratives” (1991: 244). The late-modern self, like the late-modern 
institution, is concerned with strategies of life planning through which the negotiation 
of risk and the colonisation of the future can be routinely narrativised. The project of 
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therapy for Giddens is, in short, a project oriented towards control, with “self 
determination” as its core goal. It is interesting to note that the principal way in which 
Giddens differs from the prior generation of sociologists writing on emergent 
conceptions of selfhood concerns the critical tenor of his evaluation: for Christopher 
Lasch (1979) and Richard Sennett (1974), for example, with whom Giddens is in 
active dialogue, the rise of therapeutic practices and mores was coincident with the 
decline of traditional forms of authority: famously, the name ascribed to this state of 
affairs was narcissism.7 Writing in the 1970s, these cultural commentators diagnosed 
as narcissistic a culture lacking in stable moral coordinates around which one could 
authorise one’s biography. Giddens, however, is confident that by “late modernity” 
the prevalence of therapeutic discourses should not be read symptomatically as 
evidence of “narcissistic withdrawal” on a cultural scale, but, rather, that “therapy 
should be understood and evaluated essentially as a methodology of life planning” 
(1991: 180). Although we can admit that Giddens’s appreciation of therapy as a tool 
in the integrative project of life planning is not out of sync with certain 
psychotherapeutic presentations, the point to draw out here is that once the self is 
conceived as a planning project – or a project of self-design/self-fashioning – the 
question of authorship becomes again critical: a model of therapy oriented to control 
and self-determination, it strikes me, presupposes a simplistic version of the I who 
narrates.  
If, for Giddens in the 1990s, the note of emphasis was on therapy as an 
expression of a generalised reflexivity, it has been necessary for subsequent 
commentators to consider more critically how therapeutic projects interact with the 
narratives of selfhood formed by particular socio-political orders. Much of this work 
has occurred as a critique of neoliberal practices of self-governance.8 According to the 
entrepreneurial principles of neoliberalism, the self is formulated as a mode of human 
capital driven to invest itself – via particular routes of self-improvement – in the 
pursuit and acquisition of happiness, freedom, and personal fulfilment. The degree to 
which therapeutic logics can be anything other than complicit with neoliberal agendas 
remains an open debate. As the critic Eva Illouz observes, through an emphasis on 
                                                        
7
 This line of analysis can be encapsulated by Philip Rieff’s effective coinage “where theology was 
[…], there therapy had to be” (cited in Bourne et al. 1987: 74). 
8 See Steven Groarke’s Managed lives: Psychoanalysis, inner security and the social order (2014) for a 
detailed case study of the place of Giddens’s sociology within neoliberal frameworks of self-
governance. 
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what she dubs “diseases of the will,” “therapeutic discourse offers endless 
possibilities for coherently narrativizing the life story” (2008: 196). The logic runs 
that once therapy is regarded as attending to pathologies of individual will – i.e. 
diseases of one’s own self-making – then any movement in the direction of cure will 
inevitably entail a re-making, a refashioning or re-narrativising of one’s wilful 
identity. lllouz, like many, is deeply critical of the tendency in contemporary 
therapeutic logics to make self-authorship the redemptive feature of the work; she 
explains, “therapeutic narratives can be faulted for making too much sense of one’s 
life, of binding too tightly the present, the past, and the future in a seamless narrative 
of psychic wounding and self-change” (2008: 196). We shall return below to this idea 
of being bound too tightly to futural objects and ideals in a story of linear, temporal 
progression. For now, we can summarise that when experiences of distress and 
suffering are chalked-up as failures of individual choice and life management, the 
structural and materialist causes of mental ill health are thoroughly side-lined. This 
ideological focus on the individual – where the individual is to be the agent 
responsible for the production and consumption of a satisfactory story about her own 
well-being – has been a staple feature of critical accounts that resist the totalising 
effects of a so-called therapy culture.  
Clearly, then, the quest for a seamless narrative is not the exclusive preserve 
of a therapeutic world-view, rather it is a salient feature of many disciplinary logics 
that ally sense-making and story-telling as the tools with which human beings 
navigate their worlds. Within such disciplinary logics it is possible to identify, as 
Nikolas Rose does in his important critique of the “psy. disciplines”, a “cloying 
humanism” that overestimates the degree to which the human agent is able to actively 
negotiate the narratives available to him or her (1998: 178). Rose explains that in the 
social constructionist accounts of selfhood found in the contemporary psychological 
literature (and we should add sociological literature here too),  
 
the human being is understood as that agent which constructs itself as a self 
through giving its life the coherence of a narrative. Evidently, “the self,” 
simply by virtue of being capable of narrating “himself or herself” in a 
variety of ways, is implicitly re-invoked as an inherently unified outside to 
these communications. (Rose 1998: 177) 
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To refer back to terms used earlier, such a self would be a freely choosing language-
user (rather than someone who is spoken by language). Rose’s sceptical evocation of 
a speaking subject whose very capacity to make narrative sense of her life is what 
gives that life an inherently unified shape, brings us more firmly in line with 
psychoanalytic critique.  
As a discourse of the divided subject, psychoanalysis thoroughly disrupts the 
image of a coherent narrator who is in command of her use of language from a 
position of one remove; in fact, the spectacle of an “inherently unified outside” (Rose 
1998: 177) if read through the Lacanian schema of the mirror stage (of which more 
below), evokes the first of the subject’s fateful seductions with the narcissistic image. 
We shall see later that this narcissistic seduction of the self by the self is by no means 
straight-forward, and, importantly, the case can be made that Rose’s criticism of the 
“psy disciplines,” or Illouz’s of “therapeutic discourse,” need not wholly apply to 
psychoanalysis; that somehow (and there are compelling arguments to be made in this 
vein), psychoanalysis stands to the side of the dominant therapeutic logics we may be 
concerned to critique. However, I am not convinced that such an exemption should be 
made too quickly, especially on the question of the discipline’s narrativising impulse. 
In his Narrative knowing and the human sciences, academic and practising 
therapist Donald Polkinghorne (1988) leans on the work of literary critics Peter 
Brooks and Steven Marcus to make the case that the psychoanalytic model of psychic 
health corresponds to a coherent narrative. Polkinghorne quotes Marcus to summarise 
this position: 
 
Human life is, ideally, a connected and coherent story, with all the details in 
explanatory place, and with everything (or close to everything as is 
practically possible) accounted for, in its proper causal or other sequence. 
And inversely illness amounts at least in part to suffering from an incoherent 
story or an inadequate narrative account of oneself. (Marcus quoted in 
Polkinghorne 1988: 179)  
 
For Polkinghorne, or anyone else for that matter wishing to establish psychoanalysis’s 
primary orientation to narrative, there is an abundance of evidence to draw from.9 
                                                        
9
 See, for example, Rudnytsky and Charon’s edited volume of 2008, Psychoanalysis and narrative 
medicine. 
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Françoise Meltzer for example argues that “the very process of psychoanalysis entails 
the construction of a linear, cogent narrative” because the “goal of analysis is to have 
the patient reconstruct a ‘better,’ more cohesive story as the analysis progresses.” 
(Meltzer 1995: 155). Whilst Meltzer places the idea of a “better” story in the 
obligatory scare quotes – presumably to problematize the notion of judgement – the 
real difficulty here is that the principle of narrative-making leaves un-problematized 
the particular qualities that it presupposes, namely linearity, cogency, and coherence. 
Notwithstanding the variance of narrative models at work across this body of 
literature, it is my contention that such qualities are retained by those for whom, to 
quote a further powerful exponent of this position, “it makes sense to think of 
psychoanalysis in narrational terms” (Schafer 1980: 30).  
That the construction of a story inevitably entails a degree of “narrative smoothing” 
(Spence 1986), is articulated in the Freudian concept of the dream work’s “secondary 
revision” whereby, in accordance with “considerations of intelligibility” the dreamer 
will in effect begin to tidy-up the absurdities of her dream material prior even to her 
waking-up (Freud 1900: 666). Here is Freud in Totem and taboo where the principle 
of secondary revision receives further attention:  
 
There is an intellectual function in us which demands unity, connection and 
intelligibility from any material, whether of perception or thought, that comes 
within its grasp; and if, as a result of special circumstances, it is unable to 
establish a true connection, it does not hesitate to fabricate a false one. (Freud 
1913: 95)  
 
This “intellectual function” can stand as the sense-making work of story-telling, as I 
have begun to sketch it out. Remembering Trilling’s thought above that “the 
inauthenticity of narration would seem to be its assumption that life is susceptible of 
comprehension and thus of management” (1973: 135), we might want to observe here 
in Freud’s description, how our inevitable striving for coherence is wont to lead to the 
fabrication of false connections. The elaborations and rationalisations that accompany 
“narrative smoothing” are, even within the context of the dream work, already acts of 
artful dissemblance. Which leads us to ask what kind of account the psychoanalytic 
subject may be able to give of herself that does not avail of the narrative mode? In 
powerful distinction to the line of thought encapsulated above (Meltzer, Schafer, 
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Polkinghorne, etc.), Judith Butler, in her (2005) text, raises the following challenge 
for psychoanalytic storytelling: 
 
But what if the narrative reconstruction of a life cannot be the goal of 
psychoanalysis, and that the reason for this has to do with the very formation 
of the subject? If the other is always there, from the start, in place of where 
the ego will be, then a life is constituted through a fundamental interruption, 
is even interrupted prior to the possibility of any continuity. (Butler 2005: 52)  
 
Rather than stressing the salvific function of narrative, Butler offers psychoanalysis as 
a way to attend to the subject’s irreducibility to narrative: By taking seriously the 
principle of a radical split at the heart of the subject, she postulates “a fundamental 
interruption” that sets in motion the subject’s inevitable narrative failings, thus 
making the narrative I a necessary fiction. We are now a far cry from the “cloying 
humanism” of the narrative self that has mastered her story of self-fashioning. If we 
stand by Butler’s position then we would have to go further than Chekov and suggest 
that it is not only in the beginnings and the endings that the story-teller is liable to lie, 
but that the narrative mode itself is, at bottom, deceptive. In which case, we are tasked 
with following Butler’s lead and exploring psychoanalysis’s theory of subject-
formation to develop an account of the ways in which psychoanalysis might challenge 
the seductions of a straight story.  
 
Twice upon a time: Traumatising time’s arrow 
In order to comprehend the non-linear models of temporality and causality that 
psychoanalysis foregrounds – models articulated under the sign of Nachträglichkeit, 
après coup, afterwardsness –, it is necessary to consider the status of trauma and its 
link to sexuality. Recognising that Freud’s theorisation of trauma altered considerably 
over the period of his writing (in fact, it is not too strong to say that the developments 
of his “trauma theory” provide a parallel and contracted account of the history of 
Freud’s psychoanalysis writ large), it is nonetheless possible to identify how the basic 
tenets of his account signal psychoanalysis’s resistance to the seduction of linear tales.  
In his Project for a scientific psychology (1895), Freud details an element from 
an early case to exemplify the Nachträglich production of traumatic sexuality. It is 
worth rehearsing briefly here: Freud explains that at the time of treatment, his patient, 
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“Emma,” was suffering from “a compulsion of not being able to go into a shop alone” 
(1895: 353). Emma offers a memory from her early adolescence as a way to make 
sense of her prohibitive compulsion: she remembers going into a shop alone at the age 
of twelve whereon she encountered two shop assistants who were “laughing together 
[…] at her clothes.” Their laughter prompted Emma to run out of the shop “in some 
kind of affect of fright, and, Freud adds, she also recalled that one of the shop-
assistants had “pleased her sexually” (1895: 353). Emma’s recollection of this scene 
leaves Freud with more questions than answers – why, he asks, would the memory of 
this minor humiliation retain the power to make his patient avoid shops nearly fifteen 
years later, now that she was a fully-grown woman who could be confident of her 
sense of dress? Moreover, Emma’s anxiety was specifically linked to going into a 
shop alone, a fact, Freud suggests, that does not tally with the potential to be laughed 
at on account of what one is wearing. But then the treatment yields a second memory; 
second, that is, within the order of Emma’s narration of herself to her analyst, but 
chronologically prior within the terms of Emma’s biography. Freud tells us that: 
 
On two occasions when she was a child of eight she had gone into a small shop to 
buy some sweets, and the shopkeeper had grabbed at her genitals through her 
clothes. In spite of the first experience she had gone there a second time; after the 
second time she stopped away. She now reproached herself for having gone there 
the second time, as though she had wanted in that way to provoke the assault. 
(1895: 354) 
Freud describes how the first scene (Emma’s memory of the two shop assistants at 
age twelve) is linked to the second scene (Emma’s memory of the shopkeeper at age 
eight) via the association of the shop assistants’ laughter to the “grin” of the 
shopkeeper who had grabbed her. It is important to stress that the encounter with the 
shopkeeper is presumed to have aroused no sexual excitement in Emma as she 
experienced it, and therefore it cannot strictly be described as “traumatic” (where 
trauma involves a somatic reaction). However, between the ages of eight and twelve, 
the intervening event of puberty re-inscribes Emma’s memory of her formative 
encounter with the shopkeeper with an affect that it did not originally possess: “The 
memory aroused what it was certainly not able to at the time, a sexual release, which 
was transformed into anxiety. With this anxiety, she was afraid that the shop-
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assistants might repeat the assault, and she ran away” (1895: 354). The “sexual 
release” of the second scene was transformed into anxiety precisely because it 
occurred in association with the earlier memory: in other words, finding one of the 
shop assistants “sexually pleasing” constituted an encounter with her own active 
desire that, because associated in her mind with the memory of the shopkeeper’s 
assault (and her wilful returning to the shop a second time), overwhelmed Emma and 
compelled her to flee from the situation. As Laplanche and Pontalis make clear in 
their explanation of trauma’s Nachträglich production, the quality of “trauma” is only 
conferred on the earlier memory “after the fact” (Nachträglich) – “it is only as a 
memory that the first scene becomes pathogenic by deferred action, in so far as it 
sparks off an influx of internal excitation” (1988: 467).  
I recount this case here to stress that the work of reconstructing a narrative to 
make sense of Emma’s symptom challenges the order of cause and effect through 
which the patient is accustomed to speak: the sexual trauma cannot be conceived as a 
singular event, isolable at a discrete point in the historical past. Rather “at least two 
events,” or two scenes separated by a period of time, are required for the traumatic 
“memory” of the first to be created by the occurrence of the second (Laplanche and 
Pontalis 1986: 9). That a secondary repetition is necessary to constitute the trauma of 
the so-called originary scene provides a frame to read some of Freud’s most 
enigmatic formulations such as the idea that “hysterics suffer mainly from 
reminiscences” (Freud 1893: 7), or that “the patient will begin his treatment with a 
repetition” (Freud 1914a: 150). Which means that the logic of before and after is 
shunted off course, and the story-telling convention of once upon a time becomes 
heavily ironized. All of which is to say that when a subject narrates her story under 
the sign of Nachträglichkeit, she is moved beyond the commonplace temporal 
wisdom that acknowledges the influence of the past on the future, and instead 
repositioned vis a vis a past that will remain subject to the retroactive influence of that 
which follows it, and, indeed, that which may still be to come.  
We shall see now how this discussion bears on our reading of narcissism. By 
undermining a straight temporality, the logic of Nachträglichkeit cannot but pose a 
radical challenge to the subject of narration. How are we to understand the founding 
of the I as the beginning of a narrative, once its status as an historical act of settlement 
has been so thoroughly disrupted? And if, in accordance with a psychoanalytic 
understanding of the unconscious, time is fundamentally shattered (Green 2002), what 
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modes of clinical story-telling are possible? It is necessary, then, to look further into 
the founding scene of self-identification that psychoanalysis poses. 
Narcissism: For and against narrative 
The exemplary scene of narcissistic seduction to which we can now turn is Jacques 
Lacan’s account of the mirror stage (2006 [1949]). Here, we are asked to imagine the 
moment at which a baby meets herself for the first time, and does so via the presence 
of an image. Though the mirror stage is synonymous with the Imaginary realm, we 
must also see that by providing an apparatus through which the subject will present 
her body to herself (and to the external world), this staged performance in the 
Imaginary is simultaneously the gateway to the Symbolic – (Lacan in effect makes the 
baby a little philosopher when he has her experience herself as subject and object in 
front of the mirror). It is this encounter with the specular image that catalyses the 
subject’s on-going narrative quest. On sight of her reflection the subject makes the 
narcissistic declaration “there I am” before journeying into the future via a series of 
iterative pronouncements. In other words, from the inaugural moment that she 
jubilantly assumes the image before her, the subject remains at arm’s length from that 
which she takes herself to be. Critically, this distance safeguards the onward 
momentum of her desire and simultaneously structures the temporal form of her 
identity. In psychoanalytic parlance, the term lack is used to designate this paradox 
whereby a subject’s self-assurance rests upon not having full possession of herself; 
being obliged to move forward in a quest of self-becoming to an imaginary moment 
of identity (a moment which is, of necessity, deferred), the subject is temporalized. In 
these terms, lack stands for the promise of the future, which draws the subject out into 
an essentially narrative form.  
If, however, this is the full story of the subject’s narcissistic beginnings, we 
must ask wherein lies the psychoanalytic resistance to the narrative version of 
selfhood that I have been alluding to throughout this paper. For narcissism to disrupt 
rather than consolidate a narrative account of identity, something else must be going 
on. A further possibility, then, residing within the narcissistic scene is that the 
narrative set in motion by the subject’s desire to meet the image in front of her (to be 
identical with her image) is at the same time that which covers over the incoherent 
and distinctly unnarrativisable quality of the drive. In other words, narcissism-as-
narrative is the cover story for something altogether less seductive. We can get a 
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stronger sense of this account of narcissism by remembering why it is, within the 
terms of Lacan’s story, that the baby makes her identification with the image she 
meets in the mirror in the first place. In short, she does so precisely because the 
attractive wholeness of her reflection – with its delineated contours and surface planes 
– offers relief to the uncoordinated reality of her actual, embodied experience [Lacan 
evokes the violence of Hieronymus Bosch’s artwork to convey the “aggressive 
disintegration” of a fragmented and “fragilized” body ungoverned by the I function 
(2006: 78).].  
The function of what Lacan calls méconnaissance (or misrecognition) 
“characterises the ego in all the defensive structures” – and what is always being 
defended against through misrecognition is the pressure of the drives (2006: 80). 
Although by no means straightforward, we can say of drive theory that it describes the 
coming together of organic and bodily processes with psychical structure, and in 
particular frames our understanding of the sexual. The drives are also at the heart of 
an understanding of narcissism insofar as Freud’s landmark (1914) paper “On 
narcissism: An introduction” struggles to define its object. Indeed, the major interest 
of Freud’s paper resides in the strategic slippages between narcissism as belonging to 
an originary ego, and narcissism as defining an originary state of non-distinction 
between infant and mother, self and world (i.e. an oceanic feeling of oneness).10 
Freud’s elusive conclusion, which arrives tellingly enough at the mid-point of his 
essay, is that “a unity comparable to the ego cannot exist in the individual from the 
start” (1914b: 77). Crucially, this permits us to speak of narcissism without 
necessarily speaking of the ego (and its defences). 
A narcissism of self-shattering in other words, of dissolved or undefined or 
inexistent borders between self and other – what would this look like, or, more 
appropriately, how would it make itself felt? Freud gives us a clue in his account of 
the sexual, specifically how the “polymorphously perverse disposition” of the infant 
demonstrates the unbounded nature of the drives before they are directed according to 
the “civilising” forces of “shame, disgust and morality” (1905: 191). Freud of course 
plays his own hand in directing the drives through the drama of the Oedipus Complex 
(with its “correctly” gendered resolutions), and yet his work has given enough 
                                                        
10
 That Freud vacillates between narcissism as the definition of the ego as an object, and as the priority 
of an objectless state accounts for the principal difficulty of the paper (cf. Laplanche and Pontalis 1988: 
255–7). 
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suggestive weight to pre-oedipal and perverse sexualities to allow for critical re-
evaluation. For instance, when he writes that the sexual drive and the sexual object 
are “merely soldered together” he disturbs the root of his own cultural narrative 
(1905: 147). Whatever prominence he gives to the unfolding drama of Oedipus, he 
cannot efface the original contingency of this soldering: the moment at which the 
drives are given an object, and sexuality is given over to an approved orientation.  
To shift the metaphor once more, this contingent moment of soldering the 
sexual drives to a sexual object replicates the knot of the narcissistic scene referred to 
above where the ego instantiated in imaginary identification with itself is at the same 
time a dereliction of a prior (if illusionary) oneness in which the dilemmas of identity 
and lack do not yet have a hold. If psychoanalysis is uniquely placed to take the drives 
seriously, as I suggest it is, then it must be underpinned by a theory of narcissism that 
disrupts as well as consolidates the narrative subject. Which is to say, a narcissism of 
drives, of attachments to part objects, and of a dynamic metabolisation of the world – 
rather than a narcissism of the ego. There are significant narratological consequences 
to this point of emphasis, which concern both time and character. As any reader of 
queer theory today already knows, the normative organisation of the drives and 
sanctioning of particular egoic pleasures necessarily positions the subject within 
established, well-storied timelines and in relation to idealised figures (the parent, for 
example). Inherent to a narcissism of drives, however, is the possibility of counter-
narrative and indeed of anti-narrative. To take just three prominent queer critiques: 
Lee Edelman, in his book No future (2004), writes of sexuality and the drives as anti-
narrative, and (after Joan Copjec) of narcissism as constantly interrupting all of its 
own representations. Leo Bersani, in his development of an aesthetic of narcissism, 
builds on the premise that “the human subject is originally shattered into sexuality,” 
and finds in Freud’s 1914 paper a model for narcissistic self-shattering that translates 
beyond the field of metapsychology into experimental fields of sociability (1990: 36). 
Judith Halberstam offers qualified support for this strand of queer discourse, noting 
that sex gets cleaned up when made about “self-fashioning rather than self-shattering” 
(2011: 149). As well as presenting a queer challenge to normative practices, 
reproductive ethics and modes of intersubjectivity, where the only accepted relations 
are those between already idealised human subjects, these authors deliberately return 
to narcissism and the metapsychological entanglements found therein to question the 
link between cultural practice and narrative sense.  
 17
In conclusion, it remains for me to bring together two strands of my argument: 
narcissism, and the Nachträglich character of trauma. My suggestion is that once 
narcissism is conceptually de-soldered from the object of the ego, it can be taken, 
more productively, to represent the trauma of subject-formation. 11 
To read narcissism as disruptive of narrative is to remain in tune with the 
temporal dislocations of trauma noted above (e.g. Nachträglichkeit, afterwardsness). 
If trauma is a way of de-narrativising the subject, it is unsurprising that 
psychotherapeutic theory and practice has focused often on the subject’s re-
narrativisation; however, as I have suggested over the course of this piece, there are 
several problems with such an approach. Patricia Clough’s introduction of the concept 
of “enactive witnessing” to trauma discourse is helpful here: working against a 
narrative model, Clough argues for a clinical mode of treating trauma that focusses 
not on the deconstruction and reconstruction of narratives, but on the transmission of 
bodily affect. Looking specifically at material from psychoanalytic sessions, she notes 
that a clinical stance of enactive witnessing “is not itself curative on narrative terms” 
(Clough 2009: 156), thus challenging the position of much trauma theory. Although 
Clough’s intervention is targeted specifically at the theorisation and treatment of 
trauma, it also represents (with general psychoanalytic applicability) an embodied 
theory of language. She writes:  
 
in enactive witnessing, language is allowed to drop down or fall back to the medium 
depth of the body, producing a deeper decomposition of meaning than the 
deconstruction and reconstruction of narrative. Language becomes less about content 
and more about the accompanying rhythms of affect – the punctuated, pulsing beats 
in sound – moaning and groaning, or in the calming or agitating bodily gesture – 
rocking, rubbing, twisting, twitching and quivering. (2009: 156) 
 
To stress the rhythm of language, rather than its content, is to arouse the pre-linguistic 
registers of the “fragilized” body in Lacan’s schema – at that point prior to which the 
exemplary baby seduces herself with the correct and proper object of her ongoing 
                                                        
11 In speaking of subject-formation under the aegis of ‘trauma’, I am implicitly aligning my position 
with recent moves in critical theory away from the trauma-as-exceptionality thesis (e.g. Berlant, 2011). 
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fascination (i.e. herself!). Clough’s choice of language also makes plain how the 
rhythms of affect – transmitted through speech and bodily gesture – animate the body 
in ways that recall Freud’s many descriptions of the child’s polymorphous capacity 
for sexual feeling. In this light, and considering our proposed decoupling of 
narcissism from the object of the ego, the more urgent analytic task becomes not one 
of placing language in the service of narrative, but rather of perceiving how language 
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